

# A Deeper Look at UN Peacekeeping Operations: Peacekeeping or *Pax Americana* Keeping?

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## Executive Summary

This expert comment takes a look at troubled United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, not from the vantage point of the Security Council Resolutions that create them for lofty-sounding reasons, but from the perspective of the people on the ground in the target countries who are most affected by them. In exploring the reasons why peacekeepers are called upon to leave their homes and travel to faraway places such as Haiti (MINUSTAH) and Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC/MONUSCO), this paper uncovers the reality of the lived experiences of peacekeepers and of those in the countries whose peace ostensibly needs to be kept. It raises the question of whether these experiences are properly called peacekeeping or represent a new form of neocolonial *Pax Americana* keeping. The author concludes that, in addition to the questionable political context of the two operations explored (MINUSTAH and MONUC/MONUSCO), United Nations governance of its peacekeeping missions is severely flawed, sometimes leaving its victims in even worse conditions than they were prior to the arrival of peacekeepers. Unfortunately, the combination of flawed politics and flawed governance could be a combustible mix for the future of United Nations Peacekeeping.

## Practical Steps:

- policymakers should know more about the peacekeeping missions which they approve and/or in which they choose to participate;
- contributing countries should monitor the activities of their soldiers while on peacekeeping missions and punish those who commit crimes while on mission.

**Keywords:** MINUSTAH; MONUSCO; MONUC; United Nations peacekeeping; Haiti; Democratic Republic of the Congo; George W. Bush; United States Africa policy; William Jefferson Clinton; Burundi; Rwanda

## **1. United Nations Peacekeeping: I Think We Have a Problem**

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) missions are often a source of pride for participating governments. For smaller countries, the notion that their militaries are fostering peace in the world is alluring and attractive. However, some United Nations Peacekeeping Operations have been riddled with abuse and excessive violence, marred by rape and sexual violence, corruption and worse. Edmonds (2011) noted that behavior of this type sullies the reputation of the countries providing peacekeepers and presents ethical and moral dilemmas for military and civilian leaders. This paper explores two such ongoing peacekeeping operations in light of these dilemmas and draws lessons learned from this experience. My own experience as someone who has dealt with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in a very direct way, as one who has provided oversight for certain UN operations as an elected policy maker, compels me to present these issues.

## **2. How Is United Nations Peacekeeping Evolving?**

Current contributions to research literature provide a glimpse into the future direction of UN peacekeeping. Some research focuses on the situational stress experienced by the peacekeeper (Jokovic et al., 2016). After the pandemic in Haiti, some research is geared toward preventing peacekeepers from introducing pathogens into an unblemished area (Kyei et al., 2015). But interestingly, there is little discussion about eliminating peacekeeping. In fact, the situation is just the opposite—with the introduction of wider mandates that include the use of force

and more lethal technology, peacekeepers are beginning to look like war-makers (Cunliffe, 2013).

In an interesting turn, Philip Cunliffe (2013) asserts that United Nations Peacekeeping Operations are the most widely accepted use of force globally. He points out, however, that there is an inconvenient truth embedded in UN peacekeeping reality—that these peacekeeping operations are based on a division of labor that creates his eponymous ‘legions of peace’ who come mainly from the Global South. Thus, according to Cunliffe, the unruly states of the Global South are put in check by soldiers from the more compliant states in the Global South. In essence, Cunliffe is describing the effect of UN Peacekeeping as a higher stage of imperialism. As we will see below, the two examples I have chosen demonstrate exactly that.

Mateja Peter takes this problem one step further when he argues that UN enforcement peacekeeping imposes both political solutions and military victories, and the very nature of this peacekeeping violates the values of the United Nations. He goes on to write that this circumstance “unsettles” the basic principles of U.N. peacekeeping—consent, impartiality, and nonuse of force’ (Peter, 2015). Importantly, he goes on to conclude that the failure to even acknowledge this fundamental quandary creates a ‘wall’ between operational and strategic considerations and precludes debate (*ibid.*: 351). He also complains that the UN directive that peacekeepers must take the side of the government obliterates stated UN principles of impartiality in mission after mission. He writes that the future of peacekeeping is at stake, and therefore recommends that the

mandate of United Nations peacekeeping missions move away from enforcement and the offensive use of force and refocus its efforts on 'post-conflict processes and mediation' (*ibid.*: 367).

I would posit that the lack of debate is deliberate. 'The wall', as identified by Peter, is exactly the outcome those who have the power to organize and mandate these missions want. By taking a deeper look at UN peacekeeping missions, we see that these dangerous 'externalities' are nothing more than power politics, and that the United States is using the UN as a tool to enforce outcomes that are not desired by the local people in the host countries—hence, a *Pax Americana*.

On 10 June 1963, speaking at the American University commencement ceremony, President John F. Kennedy told the people of the world the following, just a few short weeks before his murder:

What kind of peace do I mean? What kind of peace do we seek? Not a *Pax Americana* enforced on the world by American weapons of war. Not the peace of the grave or the security of the slave. I am talking about genuine peace—the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living—the kind that enables man and nations to grow and to hope and to build a better life for their children—not merely peace for Americans, but peace for all men and women—not merely peace in our time, but peace for all time...I speak of peace, therefore, as the necessary rational end of rational men. I realize that the pursuit of peace is not as dramatic as the pursuit of war—and frequently the words of the pursuer fall on deaf ears. But we have no more urgent task. (Kennedy, 1963)

In my opinion, John F. Kennedy was the last US president who realistically chose peace over war. While President Kennedy expressly rejected a *Pax Americana* enforced on the world, his ambition has not come to pass, and the United

Nations has been added to that mighty American arsenal, much to the distress and detriment of many countries of the formerly colonized world.

A by-product of the current system is that poor countries become the cannon fodder interposed between other poor countries for the enforcement of an established order that ultimately prevents certain smaller or weaker countries from exercising their sovereignty and their right of self-determination. This denial of basic rights occurs because of externalities, including the grandiose geo-strategic designs made on small or less powerful states by the world's more powerful and wealthy countries. There is an implicit threat of war, which is sometimes made explicit for countries trying to assert their sovereignty and independence. In the case of Vietnam, General Curtis LeMay reminded the world of the US capability to bomb the Vietnamese back to the Stone Age; after 11 September 2001, Pakistan received the same threat from the George W. Bush administration. One need look no further than ninety miles from the US coast, when the US admitted to attacking fledgling Cuba after Castro's 1959 revolution with subversion, sabotage and infiltration<sup>1</sup> and to making several attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro.<sup>2</sup> Today, the US is actively bombing Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Pakistan and Yemen—and this comes after US policy succeeded in destroying Libya and dividing Sudan. As we will see in the cases of

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<sup>1</sup> An index of declassified documents relating to early U.S. relations with Castro's Cuba can be retrieved from <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/bayofpigs/cuba.html>.

<sup>2</sup> Fidel Castro was not the only leader whom the United States government at that time wanted to kill. The Castro assassination attempts admitted to by the C.I.A. can be retrieved from the AARC Library ([https://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/ir/pdf/ChurchIR\\_3B\\_Cuba.pdf](https://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/ir/pdf/ChurchIR_3B_Cuba.pdf)). The first assassination approved by the president of the United States was that of Congo's Patrice Lumumba. Some of the official documentation for that and other international leaders can be retrieved from <http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf>.

MINUSTAH and MONUSCO, the United Nations enforces US policy victories with 'peacekeepers'.

### **3. A Deeper Look**

Currently, the United Nations is engaged in sixteen peacekeeping operations around the world with more than 121,000 personnel (United Nations, 2016a). An April 2016 estimate of the cost of all UN Peacekeeping Operations is more than \$8.2 billion per year (*ibid.*). According to the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Office, these sixteen operations are in the Caribbean, Africa, Asia and Europe. The authenticity of the peace being kept by these peacekeepers needs to be subjected to stricter scrutiny.

In this section, I will investigate the causes, history and challenges of two particular UN Peacekeeping Operations. The problems associated with these particular operations are of such magnitude as to warrant a serious second look by the leadership of countries contributing soldiers to them. Unfortunately, the problems highlighted here are not confined to these two peacekeeping operations.

#### *3.1. United Nations Peacekeeping in Haiti: MINUSTAH*

The UNDPKO mission in Haiti is known by its French acronym, MINUSTAH: *Mission de Stabilisation des Nations Unies en Haiti* (United Nations, 2016b). According to Security Council Resolution 1542, MINUSTAH is a Chapter VII peace *enforcement* operation. Peace enforcement—as opposed to

peacekeeping—operations imply interference in the internal affairs of other countries. The UN website tells us that MINUSTAH was created in 2004 ‘after President [Jean-]Bertrand Aristide departed Haiti for exile in the aftermath of an armed conflict which spread to several cities across the country’ (*ibid.*). Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, President Aristide says that he was ‘kidnapped’ along with his family, put on a plane by the US military and flown at gunpoint out of the country (Aristide, 2004). After several stops along the way, Haiti’s president was processed in South Africa, where he remained under the protection of the African National Congress<sup>3</sup> until he was allowed to return to Haiti in 2011 (Kasrils, personal communication, 2013). President Aristide’s decision to return to Haiti in 2011 reportedly resulted in a phone call from President Obama to South African President Zuma, complaining that the former Haitian President might be a destabilizing force in Haiti during its presidential elections (Doucet & Smith, 2011). In fact, according to the head of the Haitian Presidential Election Commission, the Haitian election was stolen by then-US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, whose Chief of Staff, Cheryl Mills, read out the wrong names as she announced the wrong election results to Haiti and to the world (Opont, 2015).<sup>4</sup> Thus the ongoing UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti has very little to do with keeping the peace and is instead enforcing an occupation, according to the view of many Haitians.

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<sup>3</sup> President Aristide’s saga was played out in the international press, but I was personally told in a 2013 conversation of the role of the ANC Intelligence Minister in receiving the Haitian President by the then-Minister, Ronnie Kasrils.

<sup>4</sup> Pierre-Louis Opont went public July 2015 with his astounding account of election theft by the US and his failure to challenge the announcement out of fear.

After reviewing the facts, it becomes clear that ‘peacekeepers’ were needed in Haiti to prevent an uprising of the Haitian people after their democratically elected president was kidnapped and prevented from returning to Haiti for seven years. Haiti’s 2010 election, held under UN ‘occupation’, was stolen. UN troops quelled the resulting disturbances instead of facilitating democracy (Reuters, 2011). It can be concluded, then, that MINUSTAH is not about protecting Haitian human rights but is rather denying them. While some champion the success of MINUSTAH in limiting the activities of ‘gangs’ and ‘thuggery’ by introducing ‘intelligence-led’<sup>5</sup> peacekeeping to the UN, a discussion of the underlying crises in Haitian politics, which clashes with the accepted narrative, is scrupulously avoided (Dorn, 2009).

Finally, in addition to denying the Haitian people their democratic rights, peacekeepers have committed their own acts of violence and injury. MINUSTAH troops have been accused of raping Haitian girls and women, with at least 229 reports from Haitians who were unable to receive food or medication unless they consented to have sex with the peacekeepers (Kolbe, 2015). UN peacekeepers in Haiti have also indiscriminately murdered poor Haitians in the seaside shantytown of Cité Soleil (Benjamin, 2008). In addition, because of their unhygienic behavior, United Nations peacekeeping troops caused the first-ever outbreak of cholera in Haiti in 2010 (Freriches et al., 2012; Ives, 2016; Al Jazeera, 2016). Unfortunately, MINUSTAH is not the exception, but is instead

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<sup>5</sup> According to Dorn, ‘intelligence led’ means a combination of the use of human intelligence (instituting a system of paid informants), imagery (taking photographs of individuals in certain areas for use in search operations) and the use of technology such as drones, snake cameras, helicopters, etc. He writes that the UN has been hesitant to institute signals intelligence—that is, wiretapping and eavesdropping.

proving to be the rule. Further details on the Haiti cholera outbreak and other aspects of the MINUSTAH Operation will be available in an upcoming Special Report on decolonizing UNDPKO.

Haitians and Haitian-American activists whom I know and have interviewed have long called for the removal of MINUSTAH troops from Haiti. They complain that the West uses UN peacekeepers to pit the poor against the poor, and that UN attempts at reform have boomeranged and created a wall of silence even worse than the situation before the reforms. The idea that peacekeeping has become a profit center for poor countries is a widespread notion. The perception is that poorer countries end up abetting the very same institutions that are responsible for acute global inequality. Unfortunately, I might be forced to agree with them that in some respects, peacekeeping has become a racket where host countries are not only left with the troops of occupying forces, but are also left with the children the peacekeepers leave behind. It remains to be seen whether MINUSTAH will work to safeguard election integrity in Haiti's upcoming 2016 election or serve as an occupying force to ensure *Pax Americana*. Hopefully the currently unfolding drama will have been resolved by the time the Special Report is published.

### *3.2. MONUSCO: The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC*

MONUC, United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), gave birth to the present occupation of Congo by the UN. MONUSCO is the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in

Democratic Republic of the Congo. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1279 was passed on 30 November 1999 and gave birth to the UN presence in DRC that year. According to the resolution, the Congo problem begins and ends with the signing of the Lusaka Accords in 1999. However, I argue that to truly understand why UN troops are stationed in DRC today, one would have to go back to the very beginning of the story. Just like the cholera outbreak and the plot to overthrow a democratically elected president in Haiti, that bloody cliffhanger begins in another country: Rwanda. After the current US-backed regime was firmly installed in Rwanda, that government turned its sights west and invaded DRC. The tragedy and the triumph of Congo, then, is that it managed to stay territorially intact, but only after Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe, and later Chad, Libya and Sudan, lent troops to the effort on behalf of the Kabila government; these African states acted to protect the territorial integrity of their fellow African state, and they also acted against the US-backed invaders of Congo—Uganda and Rwanda. President Kabila believed that Congo had been attacked because when the US asked, he refused to Balkanize<sup>6</sup> the vast and hugely wealthy country.<sup>7</sup>

Thus MONUC and MONUSCO actually begin at the moment on 6 April 1994 when two democratically elected presidents, Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda and Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi, were assassinated; their plane was brought

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<sup>6</sup> After the Balkan countries in Europe, including the territory of Yugoslavia, were broken into smaller, hostile mini-states, the process of breaking larger countries into smaller ones became known as ‘Balkanization’.

<sup>7</sup> This was told to me directly by Laurent Kabila, who proclaimed to me on the telephone that he would ‘never betray Congo’. I recount this conversation in my book, *Ain't Nothing Like Freedom* (pp. 147–48), where I complain to President Bush about the Bush Administration’s intention to break Congo into small pieces.

down by a missile as it approached Rwanda (Muhammad, 2001).<sup>8</sup> What has become known as the 'Rwandan Genocide' was sparked by this deliberate action. While the US understood what was happening at the time, it failed to act to stop the killing and also discouraged the UN from acting to stop it (Ferroggiaro, 2001). Incredibly, the US urged the withdrawal of UN troops (*ibid.*).<sup>9</sup> As a result, US ally Paul Kagame marched into Rwanda's capital and assumed responsibility for the country on 4 July 1994.

In the ensuing months, the UN commissioned an investigation of the genocide, but refused to allow the investigators to investigate the plane crash that lit the fuse. As in the case of MINUSTAH, not a single mention of this underlying context is included in the Security Council resolution. Adding insult to injury, in 2005 the United Nations acknowledged that sexual abuse by United Nations peacekeepers continued to be a persistent problem with MONUC (United Nations, 2005). As in Haiti, sex was sought in exchange for food and money. Importantly, the United Nations concluded at that time that it was up to the troop contributing countries (TCCs) to prosecute their nationals.

As in the case of MINUSTAH, we must investigate what exactly is being stabilized with the MONUC/MONUSCO operations, and for whose benefit. One answer to this question comes from Dr. Antoine Lokongo, a Congolese author

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<sup>8</sup> I tried to unravel this series of events in a day-long Congressional briefing that included the lead investigator for the UN, Mr. Bill Lyons.

<sup>9</sup> This, in effect, left the country open for the wholesale slaughter that ensued as well as the ultimate transfer of power from the crippled Rwandan government to a government led by US-trained Paul Kagame (see Document 4, Ferroggiaro, 2011).

and critical observer of the global politics played out in his country, who spoke directly of the issues involved.

Dr. Lokongo concluded that the peacekeeping operation in his country was implemented for the purpose of securing a monopoly on the foreign exploitation of minerals—in particular, protecting Western interests in coltan. He wrote to me in a personal e-mail dated 18 April 2016, ‘Fifteen small aircrafts land every day on the trail of Walikale to carry coltan, cassiterite, gold...extracted from Bisiye mine’. He adds that MONUSCO actually collaborates with the armed groups in Eastern Congo that are exploiting the minerals. He concludes that an exact date of departure needs to be set for MONUSCO because ‘we say “No” to the “internationalization of DRC” (Lokongo, 2016a).

DRC is particularly susceptible to internationalization, and Dr. Lokongo suspects that MONUSCO will not leave Congo until Congo has been balkanized, according to US policy under George H.W. Bush. In the same e-mail exchange, Dr. Lokongo says, ‘The aim of the war of low intensity still going on in eastern Congo aims to weaken the Congolese people to finally force them to accept a *fait accompli*: the Balkanization of Congo’. Moreover, Dr. Lokongo adds in a 15 June 2016 e-mail message that the United States really wants a military base in Congo (Lokongo, 2016b).

Dr. Lokongo notes that the sexual exploitation of Congolese women takes place all over Congo. As an example, he mentions Hotel Uvira on Lake Tanganyika as a MONUSCO hotspot for sex with Congolese underage girls. He offers links to newspaper stories that support his contentions (Fontan, 2012).

Consistent with the criticism of both Cunliffe and Peter, as mentioned above, Dr. Lokongo complains that in 2013, the UN created a force within MONUSCO that carries out offensive operations with or without the support of the Congolese Army. Noting the contrast, Dr. Lokongo concludes by addressing the positive contribution of the 218 Chinese peacekeepers deployed in Eastern Congo., 'They are mainly engineers and doctors, participate in rebuilding infrastructure, schools, and medical facilities. They have so far provided medical support to more than 1,600 patients' (Lokongo, 2016a). Like many Haitians, Dr. Lokongo resents the presence of the peacekeepers in his country.

#### **4. Peacekeeping—But Whose Peace?**

During the months of May and June 2016, I also interviewed three peacekeepers who served in UN peacekeeping operations. Because all three were in leadership positions, they were in a unique position to assess the mission, yet none of them reported having been briefed as to the nature of the mission. This is an incredible finding: Both before leaving their home country and after arriving in the host country, not a single one of the interviewed peacekeepers received a briefing as to why they were there. None of them reported having received a situation or country briefing describing the political, economic and social context within which the peacekeeping operation took place. According to them, they were left to figure out why they had been deployed to Sierra Leone, Liberia, Rwanda or the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait. In essence, they

were left to assume, presume and ascertain, in the best way that they could, the relevant background information about the mission.

This silence speaks volumes and certainly contributes to the wall of silence between strategic processes and operations, as Peter mentioned. In the end, I suspect that the peacekeepers are not given background situation reports because the truth is too painful to elicit cooperation. The reality is that the financial incentives both for the country contributing peacekeepers and for the peacekeepers themselves causes everyone to turn a blind eye to what is really being done in another poor country. One reality should be clear to all countries of the Global South: What you agree to do today to another can be done to you tomorrow.

On an individual basis, the peacekeepers I interviewed balanced this contradiction between personal values and personal need by offering extra acts of kindness to the local community. All three of the interviewed peacekeepers stated that they went out of their way—and beyond their United Nations mandate—to communicate with and perform kind acts for the poor people trapped in these circumstances. One peacekeeper said, 'UN peacekeeping is controlled by the US, and so we are the security guard; we are just executing their command—nothing more'. Moreover, the incentives for poor countries to participate in these operations are also proving too much to turn down. UN peacekeeping operations mean important revenues for cash-starved state budgets.

This brings me to the original motivation for this paper: to highlight the context of these missions and to unmask strategic interests and cold power plays. I agree with one of my Haitian informants, who says that countries of the Global South are being used to thwart the legitimate aspirations of their fellow Global South countries. However, the peacekeepers interviewed understood exactly what the strategic game was, even without any briefing on the specifics of their mission. In one way or another, they all said they were poor people, too; they had been colonized, too; they understood at least that much. They were all aware of some colonial or neocolonial causation for their UN peacekeeping deployments, and one peacekeeper even used the word 'neocolonial'.

In addition to the interviews above, both Cunliffe and Peter provide important food for thought for leaders of countries in the Global South who have decided to make UN peacekeeping one of their lynchpins for development, as well as for the civil servants who are charged with operationalizing that choice. Based on current research as well as the interviews mentioned above, it seems that an appropriate question to be asked by troop contributing countries (TTCs) is: Whose peace will our soldiers be keeping?

I am reminded of the important speech that the former president of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn gave to the Stanford Graduate Business School, in which he acknowledged that 'all the organs of running the world were designed to accommodate...the billion plus...who had 80% of the world's GDP' (Routson, 2010). In a world of six billion people, five billion have to make do with just 20% of global GDP. Wolfensohn's admission that the rich and powerful countries

devised the current international architecture in order to remain rich and powerful gives voice to the concerns initiated by then-president of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, when in 1965 he wrote the book *Neo-colonialism*. For Nkrumah, the imperative for newly decolonized states was to stop foreign interference in their affairs. He concluded that political independence without economic sovereignty does not protect smaller states, and thus their relations with the more powerful states in such circumstances were still colonial in effect. He called this reality 'neo-colonialism'. He wrote, 'The struggle against neocolonialism is not aimed at excluding the capital of the developed world from operating in less developed countries. It is aimed at preventing the financial power of the developed countries being used in such a way as to impoverish the less developed' (Nkrumah, 1965). Nkrumah was overthrown in a coup shortly after the publication of his book.

With whom are the troop contributing countries compliant? I think the answer is very clear: the same powerful states to which Wolfensohn refers—the movers and shakers who lead the one billion people who enjoy 80% of global GDP. The same powerful interests that Nkrumah complained about in *Neo-colonialism*. In line with the ideas put forward by Cunliffe and Peter, on the international scale, peacekeepers can be seen as the enforcers of the current US-led world order—as unjust as it is. This fact puts countries of the Global South in a bind: play nice or become even more of a victim. US tactics such as 'asymmetric' or 'hybrid warfare' further destabilize these countries and 'stage' the placement and manufacture the need for UN peacekeepers.

Formerly colonized countries of the Global South know all too well that the current architecture of international relations was constructed for the use and benefit of powerful countries. The issue for smaller countries is how best to navigate this reality. This essential struggle has defined the tenure of certain leaders of the Global South—Fidel Castro of Cuba, Mahathir of Malaysia, Sukarno of Indonesia, Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua and Evo Morales of Bolivia, to name just a few. If we take a deeper look at the destabilization currently happening in Malaysia, Venezuela and Bolivia, it would not be surprising if these countries, in order to achieve ‘peace’, soon find United Nations ‘peacekeepers’ on their doorsteps.

With this in mind, the question of whose peace is being kept becomes central to an understanding of the nature of the global order that is being maintained by UN peacekeeping operations. The persons interviewed above contribute greatly to an enhanced understanding of this matter.

## **5. Conclusion**

I have discussed recent research that posits misgivings about current United Nations peacekeeping practices. Older research expressed the idea that, at least among emerging powers, troop contributing countries would scrutinize the funding for such operations more intensely and would also inspect the mandates of such missions on a deeper level. It was then believed that this more critical examination would mean that peacekeeping missions would demonstrate more coherence with historic UN values and peacekeeping norms, such as impartiality

between or among all parties to the conflict, consent of the host state and a refusal to resort to the use of force. More recent research has found that this is not the case (Capie, 2016).

The problems with UN peacekeeping missions outlined in this paper are a clear and present danger. On the morning I was finalizing this paper, I read an editorial calling for the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers to Burundi (Editors, 2016). Moreover, in a scathing message to the international community and to the United Nations itself, a top UN employee, Anders Kompass, quit after blowing the whistle on sexual abuse by peacekeepers in Central African Republic. He will officially resign in August 2016, after dedicating more than twenty years of his life to the UN. But now, in an 'exclusive' interview with IRING, the UN's own information service, he explains his reason for leaving: cholera in Haiti, corruption in Kosovo, murder in Rwanda and cover-up of war crimes in Darfur. He accuses the leadership of the UN of abandoning the fundamental principles and values set out in the UN Charter. He writes that without a serious revamping of ethical standards at the world body, he doubts that it will be able to successfully address the challenges of today and tomorrow (Kompass, 2016).

It is my hope that this paper might encourage the men and women responsible for governance issues in peacekeeper contributing states as well as individuals inside powerful mandating states to think twice about supporting or participating in what may amount to great power schemes that compromise state values and could ultimately compromise good governance itself. As I have argued above, in the cases of Haiti and Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN peacekeeping is

nothing more than *Pax Americana* keeping. Not only is this immoral, it is intolerable. TCCs should withdraw from these missions, and UN Security Council countries of good conscience should veto them.

Looking forward, my call will be for more responsible administration of peacekeeping operations by the countries that contribute to them; I would also like to see countries decline to make troop contributions when enforcement mandates appear to be a slippery slope toward war. Finally, the need for greater administration of peacekeeping operations by contributing countries is particularly acute when the UNDPKO fails to provide appropriate governance.

I expect to follow up this Expert Comment with a Special Report that will provide my recommendations on how United Nations Peacekeeping Missions can move away from *Pax Americana* keeping toward real peacekeeping.

**Dr. Cynthia McKinney**

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