In Dialogue with "*Civilisations, States and World Order*": A Rejoinder

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Civilisations, States and World Order: Where are we? Where are we heading? is an impressive and compelling synthesis of knowledge and expertise that provides an enhanced understanding of contemporary global social and political challenges. It is unique as a contribution that opens up genuinely new space, as well as a sophisticated conceptual inventory for global public political dialogue about urgent contemporary concerns and future trajectories. Its principal author convincingly makes the case that critical reflection about contemporary world order requires the simultaneous deployment of three analytical lenses that have conventionally been kept apart: **politico strategic**, **economic**, and **cultural and civilizational**. Complemented by specialist contributions, the report explores challenges to world order through the syncretic concept of the civilization state. The Report makes its case for a differentiated analysis of (civilization) states that remains nevertheless consistently focused on the potentials of dialogue between them. Among its strengths, the Report considers the potentials and political importance of appreciating the many sources from which understandings of world order have been advanced, including from other cultures and civilisations. It thus also addresses highly problematic blindspots in much of the conventional literature on world order by subtly calling for, and explicitly contributing to, a new form of global public history.

The report successfully traces these and similar sensibilities towards a dialogic approach with which to tackle not least the contemporary revivals of authoritarianism, populism, and nationalism. Perceptively, it calls for more critical analysis of the intersections of security (politico strategic) and economic concerns and interests (we associate these with 'development'), and their backdrop in cultural and civilizational dynamics. Throughout, the report emphasizes how 'values' have shaped human development and calls for a 'deeper investigation into what they contribute to sustainable and inclusive progress' (p. 63). We agree.

But the report, as the principal author has acknowledged personally to us when encouraging us to write this rejoinder, is a beginning, not an end. It has two major "silences". These we might call, following the style of the report (i) the *Development Problematic*, and (ii) the *Ecological Problematic*. Development and the Environment are all too often thought of as discrete domains of scholarship and practice. In our rejoinder we wish to address this blindspot in much

thinking about world order. Our main objective is to demonstrate that the multiple crises which the Report identifies, and addresses are fundamentally rooted in a *Development Problematic*. There are underlining assumptions about development that are shared in significant ways by *all* states. A critical appreciation of this is essential for better understanding the transformational pressures which stem from the *Ecological Problematic*. This is so not least because the Ecological Problematic is integrally constituted by development processes.

As we demonstrate, from the perspective of geopolitical analysis, all the 'contenders' converge—despite the differences in civilizational backgrounds —on values quite closely associated with modernization, and ideologically, with modernization theoretic premises (the dominant post-1945 *liberal* theory of capitalist development, which has been directed predominantly at newly independent, sovereign states). On our analysis, it is the implications of committing to such a development agenda, rather than the undoubtedly salient differences in deep-seated idioms of enculturation and civilizational identities, that primarily drive contemporary conflict dynamics (what the Report also refers to as 'clashism'; see e.g. 19). They do so because they define and perpetuate a tacit 'common sense' about 'development' that has in practice failed in the light of the ongoing inequalities and marginalizations which the Report cites (34; 135). This 'common sense' has now also been fundamentally undermined by pervasive ecological crisis conditions. What this means is that the Report's commendable focus on questions of values and value-change is incomplete, and that the inquiry underpinning it therefore needs to go further. In what follows, we sketch these points in outline, focusing first on the *Development Problematic*, and second on the *Ecological Problematic*, while keeping the intertwined nature of both in perspective throughout.

Making Explicit the *Development Problematic*

"*Where we are*", understood as the 'determination in time and space', which the Report's subtitle refers to, is clearly an outcome of a particular history of *development*. The civilisation states central to the report may have distinctive, long-term civilizational *histories*. But in addressing these histories, the Report follows perhaps too closely in the footsteps of Huntington's (1993) rendition of 'civilisations' as self-enclosed, contiguous, geographically confined blocs, rather than acknowledging the fact that they have always been shaped (though unequally) by multiple forms of interaction, cross-connection, and colonial appropriation. Rather than be seen as historically consolidated factual constellations, the civilization states which the Report concentrates on

(notably China, Russia, India, and Turkey) should better be understood as political *projects*. They are as much aspirational as they are real, though with no less problematic or potentially dangerous implications for world order. Thus, the Report rightly centres on the need for dialogue, not least to avoid prospects of calamitous future trajectories.

Perhaps rather than Huntington's framework, thinking on civilisations, the role(s) of states and other forms of political association (cf. James Scott, 2010), should follow the work of the late Robert Cox (2000). In Cox' analysis, as in much of the work produced by post-colonial and decolonial scholars, the history of development has had to be told as a *global* history of entangled relations, often centred on contested power, privilege, exploitation, and domination (Shilliam, 2008). This critical insight is in keeping with the Report's strengths in subtly steering towards a new public global history (see for instance the references to Bilgin and Kee Beng on page 85). 'Globalising' such knowledge as public political history is also highly significant for countering rising authoritarianism, populism and nationalism. This is not least because the Report perceptively links these trends (whether in the USA, UK, China, India, Russia or Turkey) to the significance of the *interconnection between 'security' and what the principal author refers to as 'economics'* (cf. p. 27). We think of this constellation as the *Development Problematic*, taking into account the intrinsic production of insecurities for many in the process of the pursuit of the modernization project through (liberal) capitalism.[1]

The *Development Problematic* as we construe it here, is integral to many of the crisis trends that the principal author identifies and associates not least with the politics of protectionism and xenophobia (35). However, the critical insight about the *link* between security and development cannot be appreciated in its significance and broad implications because of the analytical lens used to examine civilization states, rather than foregrounding the development problematic as advanced here. As a result of its adoption of a macroscopic, state-centred analytic, the Report's commendable identification of vulnerabilities (such as rising poverty and economic inequalities) is conceptually disconnected from the causes of such experiences. The latter are outcomes of transnationally constituted development projects sustained by joint elite interests and networks, and cannot be evaluated in straightforward state-centered terms. This 'blindspot' 'becomes clearer in the context of the Report's advocacy for free trade, and trade-based multilateralism. A brief discussion of the problems involved in how this is construed in the Report allows us draw attention

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[1] Our position about development so conceived thus diverges from that of the Report. In line with other critics of developmentalism (indicatively, Hindess, 2001), we proceed from the perspective that *liberalism* has always comprised contradictions, philosophically and practically, not least in ways that have consistently permitted authoritarian variants. This extends to capitalism, which has, of course, long had well-documented variants not aligned with common-sense understandings of liberalism (consider, for example, early 20th century accounts of 'state-monopoly capitalism').

to what it misses about the Development Problematic in exemplary fashion: As already suggested, in the contemporary context all 'states' are (minor differences aside) premised on a development model that can be traced to commitments to development through modernization-processes, centred on the state-form. Important problems attach to this:

The state-centred account, and the practices it enables, rests on an uninterrogated commitment to an ideology of 'national development', primarily associated with economic growth, where the latter is expressed by an internationally agreed-upon set of indicators. An upshot of this is a common-sense discourse resonating across the globe, *and* across the civilizational clusters, which have now come to articulate and share the idea that economic austerity policies are a precondition for realizing economic growth. The latter, in turn, serves as the *measure* of civilizational progress (Huntington's work on development amply bears this out). In the contemporary context, the free-trade agenda which the Report references and (though cautiously) endorses, reflects this assumption about trade and development. The Report misses crucial shifts that have occurred along the way from the GATT to the WTO, with the latter comprising new trade agreements including TRIMS, GATS, TRIPS for instance. These often have the *effect* of legitimising and reinforcing conditions of deprivation. Such deprivation has resulted, for example, from new forms of property rights embodied in free trade agreements negotiated and implemented since the 1980s. The scope of free trade agreements has shifted significantly from a focus on the removal of 'tariff barriers' on goods (and/or services). Instead, it now encompasses new forms of regulation centred on commercial law that have had the effect, for instance, of configuring 'public services' as competition-distorting obstacles to efficient market allocation.

For example, on one reading the GATS agreement can be seen as predominantly about constructing markets for public services and sectors, such as water, health, public transport, education, infrastructure, or financial services. TRIPS and TRIMS relate to exclusive property rights to what has been, or may in some cases still be, the 'commons', or 'Common Pool Resources' (see the controversy over patenting of the Neem tree or HIV medication; see also Ostrom, 1992 for a general critical discussion of economics and the commons). The social, economic, and political consequences of the privatization processes preceding GATS-accessions have been severe in many communities across the globe, but especially in the Global South (on deprivation of and communities rights-claiming strategies over water and health, see indicatively Morgan, 2011; Conca, 2006; Weber, M. 2020).

The realization of this free-trade agenda as a centre-piece of developmentalism is obviously a form of redistributive politics, though it is not necessarily of the kind that the Report calls for

otherwise in *response* to the problems created through development (see on this point, for example, the report's critical discussion of the impact of free trade on *some* sections of communities in the UK and the US, p. 35). It is also important to note here that when production has moved to, or into the remit of the South in the context of trade-led globalization, workers have often been exploited and denied organized representation and/or meaningful rights protections. This has prompted recent research to shift attention from 'production chains' analysis to 'poverty chains' analysis (Selwyn, 2019).

The critical point we articulate here is different from negative discourses of free trade such as those mobilized by populist nationalists. The latter couch their response as if the contemporary free trade and development agenda is about benefits that accrue for *some states only*, rather than the way in which it privileges investor rights and facilitates the progressive commercialisation of public goods and services in *all* states. Populism and xenophobia are mobilized to detract from understanding these explanations of development-induced inequality and poverty.

Instead, our engagement with the contemporary free trade and development agenda is based on a critical understanding of its shift to investor rights and the commercialisation of public goods and services. Through this critical analysis we raise an *immanent* problem of capitalist development, liberal or otherwise. It is based on the insight that the developmental model is now explicitly directed at harmonising and unifying public policy through the prerogatives of commercial law (on the WTO, development, and commercial law, see Krajewski, 2003; Kelsey, 2010).

Where the Report begins to explicitly engage with development as a solution to endemic contemporary conflict trends, advocating for example the restoration of 'balance' (112), it calls for a shift from 'super-power rivalry to securing the SDGs' (112). This is understandable in light of the real worries about the decline of multilateralism, and collective problem-solving through international institutions and coalitions. Also, such a sentiment resonates with the momentum that has gathered behind advocacy for the SDG-agenda, as well as with the generally shared appeal of the power of sustainability as a framing concept for development. However, as the principal author notes, the 'devil, as always, will be in the details' (122); a closer look at *some* of these details in the context of the SDG agenda quickly brings us back to the critical reconstruction of the *Development Problematic* raised above. The free-trade agenda with the problematic implications discussed above, is expressed explicitly through the SDGs. The SDG agenda has little or no reference to redistributive politics or policies aimed at ameliorating rising discrimination and deprivation (H. Weber, 2014, 2017; Sexsmith and McMichael, 2015).

One key aspect of the *Development Problematic* is the effective empowerment of transnational oligarchic interests. Politicians in the populist mode in many cases mobilize racial and ethno-nationalist discourses in order to deflect attention away from the *contradictions of development* (van der Pijl, 2005; Amin, 2016). Samir Amin recently provided a reminder of the need to correct dominant public history of the post-WWII period by revisiting the significance of the 1955 Bandung conference for both, contemporary world order constellations, and for potential future trajectories. We don't necessarily share Amin's rather optimistic stance, which anticipates Russia and China as facilitators of a 'post-hegemonic', polycentric world order. On this, we are closer to the Report's cautious approach, which notes the propensity of 'civilization state' projects to pursue hegemonic leadership, together with the potential political problems this raises. But Amin's account nevertheless provides a cogent reminder of the significance of those continents and peoples that the Report's focus on select 'civilization states' overlooks, and thus inadvertently sidelines (notably Africa and Latin America). Important progressive international political initiatives were developed in direct relation to the Bandung Spirit, including the call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1970s.(see Pasha, 2016; Weber, 2016; Murphy, 2016; N'Pham & Shilliam, 2016).

The Silence about the *Ecological Problematic*

In considering the current shifting trajectories of multilateralism, and what this means for world order, the Report raises the general question of whether it may be that "we are working with a failing paradigm" (104). It configures this failure as a function of the 'liberalism/nationalism' stand-off. This is insightful and important, as it suggests that dialogic interactions may help to ameliorate and contain the rise of populist nationalism, without necessarily implying a straight-forward return to a liberal consensus. This prepares the ground in the Report for an exploration of what resources there might be for such dialogic political possibilities and how these are either facilitated or impeded by the rise of what is identified as 'quantum-politics'. The Report conceives of the latter in terms of the effects of the information technology revolution and its ambiguous socio-political and economic implications.

This configuration of a 'failing paradigm', however, does not address or process what is arguably the most significant, pervasive and consequential socio-political challenge for the contemporary world order, namely the multi-faceted ecological crisis. We refer to it here summarily as the *Ecological Problematic*. This problematic is systemic and complex. It is not reducible simply to CO2 (equivalent) emissions, but rather involves the need for a wholesale reconceptualization of,

for instance, agricultural practice, land management, biodiversity maintenance, as well as remedial and adaptive work. Insofar as the Report remains attached to the broad question about likely hegemonic leadership into the future, what shape this could take, or which of the civilizational states in question may assume it, the *Ecological Problematic* challenges its entire premise: none of the possible contenders have a plausible answer to the ecological problematic at present. Yet it is abundantly clear that hegemonic leadership, which always depends on the capacity of the hegemon to provide enough and sufficient 'public goods' for the dominated to acquiesce in its rule, would depend on such an answer. In our assessment, this requires a wholesale shift in political affairs that is co-extensive with the scope of the *Development Problematic*. Below, we provide a brief outline of why the political, social and economic changes inaugurated by the *Ecological Problematic* should be understood to be much more transformative than has been commonly assumed. This assessment extends to much of the work oriented towards the kinds of multilateralism that the Report seeks to salvage (indicatively, Biermann, 2018).

We present the *Ecological Problematic* as central to the question of *"where are we"* raised by the Report. It is instructive to rehearse some of the parameters of the trajectories for world order discussed in the *Development Problematic*. The transition to industrial capitalism, which started in the mid-18th century in Britain (and spread from there to European neighbours and into the colonized lands) produced what has become referred to as the *Social Question*. The Social Question, in brief, comprises the specifically modern problems of mass displacement and impoverishment, alongside a whole range of new, 'civilizational' diseases and deprivations (see, for instance, Patel, 2007). In the process of the emergence of the Social Question and the transformation towards wage-labour, the *old* political-economic order disappeared, and did so relatively rapidly. A small, but nevertheless telling, vignette for this is the infamous Peterloo Massacre of 1819, when workers struggling against low pay, high rent, and bad working conditions, gathered in their 'Sunday Best' to try and hand over a *petition* on their plight to the Prince Regent. The point here is that the Prince Regent was no longer in a position to offer the redress which the petitioners sought. "Petitioning" had simply ceased to function as a political register of legitimate self-representation with the prospect of success, because the *actual* (political) authority had migrated elsewhere. It now rested in the hands of magistrates and political representatives some of whom were, in the Peterloo case, in personal union with the 'policing' forces and the industrialists benefitting from the wage-regime against which the protest was directed.

This little vignette provides an indication of a wholesale shift in the very ways in which 'politics' was done; eventually, it engendered more movement politics, the struggle for the

franchise, new registers of representation entering into the picture, and, eventually the 'welfare state' in its different forms and national expressions. However, the 'Social Question' itself ('poverty and exclusion', for short) did not get 'resolved'; it remained in the heartlands of industrial capitalism, and it was *exported* to the 'colonies'. The promise of its resolution was deferred to such time when the markets would grow large enough to allow a) the largest number of people to be able to sustain themselves by earning good enough wages in the labour markets; and b) those temporarily or permanently *excluded* from the labour markets to be compensated and socially 'included' by ways of fiscal redistribution and welfare measures. It is in this way that the resolution of the Social Question has continued to be rendered contingent on realizing the promise of development, exactly as we discussed in the *Development Problematic* above. The unintended, though by no means unacknowledged, consequence of this bargain has been compromised ecological systems on a massive, and accelerating scale: the modernist project of pursuing the gradual resolution of the Social Question through development has produced the *Ecological Problematic*, which can be captured as the *Ecological Question* (EQ) in the following terms: 'How should we design our polities and economies to minimize or reverse the ecologically detrimental impacts of development as we know it?'

The *EQ* is new and unprecedented. The institutional responses that have been implemented in patchwork fashion in the post-1945 development era towards resolving the SQ, were not designed to deal with it, let alone with its enormous implications and consequences. Contemporary talk about 'Global Environmental Governance', for example, typically revolves around addressing environmental problems from *within* the parametrics of understanding set by the Social Question: global carbon-emissions are too high? Let's design a scheme that puts absolute ceilings on them, and create a pollution permit trading system, as part of a wider effort to make market actors realize the 'full costs' of environmental degradation. This solution premised on the idea that the 'negative externalities' (excessive carbon emissions) can be addressed by way of internalizing them in the form of costs into market relations reflects the tendency to address new problems in terms of 'old' solutions. The distributive consequences and implications are typically not considered (Dauvergne, 2016). However, neither is the question of whether such a trans-substantiation of pollution-output into nothing but a prize-relevant cost factor occurs without substantive losses, omissions, or potential for failures.

The effect of 'endogenizing' the *EQ* into the established logics of dealing with the *SQ* is potentially (and in actual fact in some cases already) perverse. In 'solving' the problems of the *EQ* that way, there is a tendency to contribute to *increasing* social exclusion where entitlements

are based on labour-market participation; in effect, this sets up a 'zero-sum' game with regard to 'environment vs. development'. For the Report, this means also that one of the most striking features of the rise of 'new right politics has been overlooked, namely that practically *all* of it in its different contexts across the world is *anti-environmentalist*. Consider for example, the German AFD, through the Brexit rhetoric of right-leaning Tories or sympathizers of Faragism in the UK, the political right (and far-right) in Australia, Bolsonaro's ruling party, Trumpism in the US, the political rhetoric of Erdogan in Turkey or Salvini in Italy. It is evident that environmentalists and environmental political concerns are configured by the political right as 'enemy others', undermining national development *and* ostensibly treasured cultural, social and political identities.[2] Behind such trends is a wide-spread, if diffuse (because disarticulated) sense that a 'new' politics of ecological change is likely to bring with it significant distributive challenges. The rampant *anti-environmentalism* in new-right political movements the globe over is thus the upshot of a politics of fear based on anticipating this challenge, and themselves as the likely losers in the process.

At the same time, it is *very* clear that the *EQ* could be addressed better with radically altered approaches to designing and maintaining incentive systems, or by way of expanding institutional design ideas that are less focused on competition and more on outcomes. Elinor Ostrom (1992) won a Nobel-Prize in economics for proving this theoretically. She did so by modelling sustainable uses of commons shared among different actors interested in harvesting from them in terms of outcome-oriented, fair, institutionalized rulemaking. She based virtually all of her 'modelling' work on *actual* institutional designs documented from empirical case examples and was able to demonstrate that these delivered in various ways superior outcomes when compared with competitive, market-based schemes. Her work raises real and pertinent questions about "working with a failing paradigm". The scope of failure in ecological affairs affects how *all* of the civilizational states discussed in the Report currently approach core issues of economic organization and institution building. Ostrom's demonstration of cooperation as superior constitutes, in this context, a promising road not taken, or never even seriously considered. Her grounding of the modelling in empirical examples raises the very real prospect that there are in fact institutional designs 'out there' that can potentially address both, ecological concerns with sustainability, and social concerns with exclusion and development.

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[2] Jobbik in Hungary may be cited as an exception, though it is so mainly with regard to the more narrow question of 'climate scepticism'; the other examples invoked above all involve commitments (in some cases realized) to tearing up environmental regulation, and to abandoning or undermining multilateral efforts. The only other example we came across of a right-wing populist attempt at 'greening' was Marie Le Pen's short, but unsuccessful attempt to put Front Nationale on such a footing.

High modernist "development" (as discussed under the *Development Problematic)* produced the *Ecological Problematic*, while failing to resolve the Social Question of poverty, exclusion and exploitation. Both now can only be resolved together. Failing to address the Social Question of poverty and inclusion will increase pressures to engage in unsustainable procurement practices. Attempts to resolve the Social Question through violent repression are equally likely to advance rapid ecological decline. And 'greening' existing institutional designs without addressing the increasing social calamities entailed in maldistribution, exclusion, and domination (which the Report duly notes!), is likely to fail as a result. Yet, neither the theory or practice of global governance, as expressed for instance in the form of the SDG initiative, nor new or re-constituted hegemonic leadership, whether existing or emerging, would appear to be able to provide plausible answers at present.

We are in agreement with the Report's normative goals, placing dialogic approaches at the centre of efforts to reconstitute world order. In this dialogue, the missing *Ecological Problematic* will have to be critical, not least because the transformations it signals (and of which the Ostrom example provided just hints, but is by no means exhaustive) are at least as momentous as those faced in the context of the 'rise' of the modern industrialist development paradigm.

By Way of a Conclusion: In Dialogue with "*Civilisations, States and World Order*" - which values, what progress and for what different kind of politics?

Our discussion above has been conducted in the spirit of dialogue with the Report which speaks directly to a global problematic that is rendered primarily as a geopolitical dynamic in world politics. We appreciate that the Report is scoped to macro-political analysis, and that its focus on geo-politics is motivated by seeking out an account of the big picture. At the same time, though, we have appreciated that the Report draws connections to 'lived experiences' and political struggles, and to concerns over 'security' and 'economics'. It does so, however, without explicitly associating these concerns with a wider global *Development Problematic* shared by all states as part of their justifications regarding civilizational progress. We think that analysis of current crises must go beyond constrained ideas about geo-politics by complementing these with accounts of struggles in global development over questions of social, political and ecological justice.

The report provides the basis for thinking through such struggles given that it centres very much on questions of 'values' and acknowledges the need for a 'deeper investigation into to what

they contribute to sustainable and inclusive progress' (p.63). Our main objective has been to deepen this engagement on values and progress by explicitly discussing two silences, *the Development Problematic* and the *Ecological Problematic*. We see these not as separate issues but as a constitutive part of the dominant *Development* paradigm. A paradigm shift is urgently needed. Such a shift must come through institutional policy / political transformations complemented by revised accounts of global public political history. The latter is significant if we are to counter nationalism and xenophobia, defined not only by white racism, but also by discrimination directed by different groups at those identified as 'external others'.

The *values* necessary for a more humane and ecologically sustainable present and future cannot be derived from the normative resources of 'civilization states'. This is because all states are committed to a developmental logic which has been realised through violence, expropriation, discrimination and deprivation. The baseline values of this project were set as the international benchmark for emulation in the post-1945 context. All states have *normalised* these value commitments, justified as part of the process *en route* to consolidating high-modernist civilization.

However, as has always been the case, there are telling examples that testify that humane and ecologically inflected values have sustained communities globally. Social movement campaigns for dignity and entitlements for all often pick up on this. It is commendable that the Report indicates some of this. It does so, for instance, with reference to recognizing that sensibilities of ethics and rights exist that have predated international Human Rights doctrine. The discussion of the ethics of Manu regarding the laws of war predating, for instance, the Geneva convention (80), is a crucial reminder that Eurocentric assumptions about morality, justice and rights are in need of correction (for another example, see Grovogui, 2011).

Increased attention to what different cultures across the globe may have to offer on dealing with the integrally related development and ecological problematics, is indeed critical. For example, in New Zealand, Maori activism, together with some Pakeha collaborators, fought for, and eventually established 'legal personhood' for the Whanganui River (National Geographic, 2019). It will not be straight-forward to bed this down in a liberal justice system. By extension, the settler state political system will over time change as a result of this, and other similar initiatives that might come. These changes come about significantly in the light of a normative (Maori) framework that has *always* included environmental entities in its conceptions of 'living law'. In a similar vein, changes to the constitutions of Bolivia and Ecuador to include the 'rights of nature' are cogent responses to the problems we discussed, *and* also underscore limitations of

contemporary modern constitutional (state-centred) development thinking and its alignment with economic growth (see Bebbington & Bebbington, 2011).

We strongly agree with the Report's implication that such related knowledge needs to figure much more centrally in global public history (as noted by Pinar Bilgin, p. 85). Similarly, Bandung and its legacies must be returned to analyses of global politics. It will also correct the assumption that 'rights were very much a European conception while order was much the greater African and Asian priority.' (p. 24). Indeed, it has arguably been the inverse.

Such accounts of the history of development are crucial for countering conventional often uncritical understandings of global history and associated assumptions of a 'Third World' malaise and causal explanations of failed states, and migration. 'Western history' (see p.103) is deeply implicated in the history of the production of poverty and ecological degradation in non-Western places (Anghie 1993). Industrialisation cannot be delinked from enslavement. However, much more is at stake than merely acknowledging such a connection. We require a shift in understanding of *the implications of those values* that got us here. We must look back to move forward in dialogue and retrieve alternative civilizational values.

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